Watersheds have the characteristic of connecting people vertically by water flows. The location of the people along the watershed defines their role in the provision and appropriation of water which makes relationships among users of the resource more complex. Verticality in watersheds thus imposes a challenge to collective action. This paper presents the results of field experiments conducted in four watersheds of two different countries: Colombia (South America) and Kenya (Africa). We recruited around 639 watersheds inhabitants from upstream, midstream and downstream locations in these basins and conducted field experiments to study the role that location and verticality plays in affecting cooperation, at the provision and appropriation decisions. Two field experiments were conducted: the "Irrigation Game" a new experimental design (Cardenas et al, 2008a) that includes the provision and appropriation nature of the resource, and the "Water Trust Game", an adaptation of the Trust Game (Berg et al, 1995) where we explicitly announce the actual location upstream or downstream of the two players. The results show that reciprocity and trust are very important motivations for upstream-downstream cooperation and that the role of upstream players has important implications in water provision decisions. Results from both experiments suggest that the lack of trust from downstream players towards upstream players restricts the possibilities of cooperation among the watershed users.
Introduction
Watersheds are systems that have the characteristic to connect people vertically by water flows. The strong interdependency among users along social and biophysical scales makes their relationships complex and generates challenges to water and watersheds management.
Watersheds, like other asymmetric systems such as irrigation systems, present both dimensions of common pool resources (CPR): provision and Provision refers to the actions done to create, maintain and improve the resource and avoid its destruction. Appropriation, on the other hand, refers to allocation of the resource among users appropriation (Ostrom, Gardner and Walker, 1994) . In these systems, the location of people along the system defines their role in water provision and appropriation decisions. Thus, verticality in watersheds imposes additional challenges to collective action.
Additionally, watersheds are characterized by an important biophysical and socio-economic heterogeneity that generates a variety of actors. These actors face different economic and environmental conditions, like unequal access to the resources, especially water in terms of its quantity and quality. Indeed, watershed management requires coordination and cooperation in the management of natural resources across many different levels of socialspatial aggregation (Swallow et al, 2006 ) and involves handling upstream-downstream relationships.
Collective action for water management in watersheds require coordination among small communities to manage water points or develop water supply systems and intra-community cooperation on sharing stream flows or restricting practices that can increase water pollution (Swallow et al, 2006) . However, cooperation in the provision and appropriation of water is affected by the rival nature of the resource and the asymmetries on their access.
Trust and reciprocity are important mechanisms in a relationship that involves externalities and coordination failures and these mechanisms are enhanced by the aware about dependence among participants (Ostrom, 1998; Ostrom and Gardner, 1993) . Due to the nature of watersheds, trust and reciprocity in these contexts must be built at different scales and among appropriators of different levels. Upstream-downstream trust and reciprocity relationships can be a determinant the solution of CPR dilemmas in watersheds.
In this study we conducted new experimental designs in the field with the participation of rural communities' inhabitants of four watersheds of two countries: Colombia and Kenya.
Through these experiments, we expected to observe the factors that can enhance trust and collective action in a context of dependence among people in different locations along a watershed, which means asymmetric access to better quantity or quality water. We recruited around 639 watersheds inhabitants from upstream, midstream and downstream locations. The field experiment approach was used in order to achieve a better understanding of the effect of participants' location on water systems and the factors that influence provision and appropriation decisions on this context. Two field experiments were conducted: the "Irrigation Game", a new experimental design (Cardenas et al, 2008a) that includes the provision and appropriation nature of the resource, and the "Water Trust Game", an adapted version of the Trust Game (Berg et al, 1995) framed around water which presents the dependence among players related to water and compensation flows.
Section 2 summarizes literature related to the effect of verticality in collective action.
Section 3 describes the experimental context, design and implementation. Data analysis and graphic results are presented in Section 4 and regression results in Section 5. This paper concludes with an analysis of the results and a discussion of future research and policy implications.
Verticality in Collective Action
Actions of people living in the upstream areas will affect those downstream far more than those downstream can directly affect those upstream. Upstream people have the possibility to take better quantity and quality water, besides they generate flows of soil and pollutants that affect downstream people. Since the position of the individuals along the system determines their access to water -appropriation-and their possibilities to influence other actors, this condition will define their willingness to cooperate in the provision of the resource. This vertical provision and appropriation relationship among watershed actors is presented in other water systems like irrigation systems. (Ostrom and Gardner, 1993) .
Following Ostrom and Gardner (1993) the incentives faced by the players along the water canal are very different. The higher the position of the players, the bigger the incentives to contribute to the water canals maintenance. So we expect to observe a pattern over time in which the headenders contribute more labor and get more water than tailenders. "The game equilibrium with headenders contributing more than tailenders has undesirables properties, in the sense that production will be less than optimal and the system will be undermaintained (Ostrom and Gardner, 1993) The combined appropriation and provision problems of CPR implies that the nature of appropriation problem is affected by how well the provision problem is solved (Ostrom et al, 1994) .
In watershed and irrigation system contexts, where vertical relationship among participants and asymmetries in appropriation are presented, there is a real mutual dependence among players and can arise incentives to change the distribution of water in order to improve the provision of water by those located at the end of the system (Ostrom and Gardner, 1993 ).
This could happen by a water-for-labor exchange or water-for-money exchange that can be seen as reverse flows. The downward flows of water, soil, and pollutants, can be counterbalance by reverse flows of commodities, money, regulation or influence (Swallow et al, 2006) . However, the possibility for these exchanges and other cooperation agreements among players in different locations of the system depends on trust and reciprocity relationships among them.
Anthropologists studying the pre-columbian Andean cultures have identified the important role that these vertical relations played, through myths, in the understanding of the relationships between high mountains and the regions downstream (Murra, 1972 (Murra, , 1985 Osborne, 1985 Osborne, , 1990 . The combination of a tropical location along with the Andean geography created certain conditions where the interdependence between actions upstream and well-being downstream for social groups became a major concern in the management of land, agriculture and trade. Murra in particular developed the model of verticality or ecological complementarity to explain the complexity with which the Andean cultures developed a system of natural resource management based on the complementarities of the high lands and the low lands. For such system to work, it is very important to coordinate the actions upstream and downstream with the basin as a whole management unit.
However, much of the agricultural land in mountainous regions around the world is managed through systems of private property rights and eventually some higher level management based on institutional arrangements by regional or local governments attempting, rather weakly, to regulate land uses along the watershed.
Experimental design
Water and watersheds management have some features that impose additional difficulties to collective action, like the rival nature of the resource and the asymmetries on its access that depend on the location of participants along the water system. In order to identify the effect that location in a context of vertical relationship around water can generate to collective action, and the factors that are more likely than others to increase levels of cooperation in this context, we developed a framed field experiments strategy 2 in two real settings of water users in Colombia and Kenya. The provision and appropriation nature of water and the asymmetries in access due to location were included through a new experimental design called the Irrigation Game, while trust between actual upstream and downstream players is incorporated in an adaptation of the trust game framed around water and reverse flows represented as payments.
Design and implementation

a. The Irrigation Game
This game introduces the asymmetries in the access to the resource among players. In the first part of the game players make the decision of how many tokens of their endowment of ten, they want to contribute to a project to maintain water canals, so the amount of available water depends on the total contributions according to a monotonic function of water production (Graph 1). Non contributed tokens are kept in a private account which yields private returns as well. The second decision of the players is the individual water extraction from the total water produced. This decision is taken according to the location of the players along the water canal, which is defined randomly and is represented by a letter: A for the player in the first position and E for the player in the last position (Graph 2).
Graph 1. Water Production Function Graph 2. Players Location
After the first ten rounds of baseline treatment, rules changed for some groups and this change is announced aloud to the players. Some groups were permitted to communicate; other face external regulation treatments and other groups continued playing with the baseline conditions.
In the face-to-face communication treatment, players were allowed to communicate with the other players in the group before returning to their places to make their own private decisions. Likewise in the baseline, they know the aggregate decision but not the individual decisions after each decision round. In the external regulation or penalty treatments players were told that there would be a chance of being monitored each round.
The experimenter rolled a dice in front of the participants each round and if the number obtained is 6, all the participants were inspected, so the probability of being inspected was 1/6. In this case, the monitor checked the decision of the players and the players that had taken more water than the permit level, they had to pay a fine. The permited level for each participant of a group was the fifth part of the water produced. In the high penalty 
b. The Water Trust Game
Based on the standard trust game (Berg et al 1995) , we constructed our Water Trust Game (WTG) framed around water access and distribution between two people located in different positions of a watershed. At the beginning of the game both players were endowed with 8
tokens. Player 1 (proposer) could send a fraction of her initial endowment to player 2 (responder). The amount sent by player one was tripled before it reached player 2 who then decided how to split the tripled amount plus her initial endowment between herself and player 1 (Graph 3). In our framing, however, we explicitly framed the decision of player 1, if upstream, as the quantity of clean water sent to player 2 downstream, and player 2's decision as an economic compensation for the water provided by player 1. If the game started with a downstream player, also such decision was framed as an economic compensation for the water provided by player 2. .
We implemented the trust game using the strategy method, that is, players 2 were asked the complete strategy of responses to each possible offer by player 1. Therefore player 2 had to respond, without knowing yet the amount offered by player 1, how many tokens she would return to player 1 for each possible offer by player 1 (0, 2, 4, 6, 8 units). The strategy method was used to get data of all conditional responses of second movers to all possible decisions of the first mover. During the session we also asked each of the players the amount they expected from the other player.
Sample of participants
We recruited around 639 watersheds inhabitants from upstream, midstream and downstream locations of Coello river and Fuquene lake watersheds in Colombia and
Awach and Kapchorean rivers in Kenya. The distribution of the players between the games and the total number of observations are shown in table 1. WATER TRUST GAME IRRIGATION GAME Kenya Colombia
The Irrigation Game was conducted with a sample of 355 participants and the Water Trust
Game with a sample of 284 participants from both countries distributed as shown in table 1.
Data analysis and results
Irrigation Game
The Social Optimum or Maximum Social Efficiency is an availability of 100 units of water that means a total contribution of 45-50 tokens. Nash Equilibrium is zero-contribution obtaining a suboptimal result of 50% of the maximum social efficiency possible. The overall results replicated the patterns of previous public goods or CPR games where predictions of non-cooperative game theory were not a common result and communication permitted to improve cooperation.
The contribution was on average 4.82 tokens, 48.2% of players' endowment, for the ten initial rounds. For the second stage of the game, the groups that continued playing with baseline institution got an average contribution of 4.71 tokens (47.1% of their endowment), the groups that could communicate reached a contribution of 5.9 tokens on average, and the penalty treatments groups obtained an average contribution of 4.83 for high penalty and 3.96 for the low penalty groups. However, the average contributions shown in the four panels in Graph 4 hide an important piece of information for our analysis. These are averages of five players who are located asymmetrically along the watershed, with contributions being monotonically greater the higher is the location of the player in the irrigation system. As we go downstream, the average contribution by the players reduces substantially as shown in the average contributions by player type, with A players being those assigned to the head end of the system and the E player as being the last player in the sequence of appropriation stage of the game. 
Player location Contribution T-statistic
Recall that these locations are assigned randomly at the start of each session and remain constant throughout the game. The results suggest that as one individual is assigned a unit further down in the irrigation system, her willingness to contribute to the public fund that provides water for all players decreases, eroding the possibilities of building collective action along the watershed. However, the type of institution applied defines the persistence of the situation of remarked differences in contribution or a situation in which contribution -and maybe distribution -is more homogeneous among players. The comparisons of the behavior of the players about contribution and extraction by institution are in Graphs 6 and 7.
Graph 6. Irrigation Game contribution by player location and institution
Graph 7. Irrigation Game irrigation by player location and institution
While the external regulations -high and low fine -have some positive effect in the distribution of water, these regulations crowded-out the cooperation behavior. On the other hand, if the participants are allowed to communicate, they make higher contribution decisions that mean a higher amount of water available for all the players. Besides, the possibility of communication helps to improve the distribution of water among players, reducing the differences on access to water among players, especially among A and E players. Similar results have been found in common pool resources games, where external regulations crowded-out group-oriented behavior in favor of self-interest (see Cardenas et al, 2000) Let us now turn to the second game used, the Water Trust Game, where we study the role of the actual location of the players in the watershed and not the experimental location as studied in the irrigation game.
Water Trust Game
Regardless of the location, the Nash prediction in the trust game is for player one to send zero and player two to return zero. Graph 8 shows the amount sent by player 1 and the amount retuned by player 2 as a response to the different options that player 1 could offer to player 2. We are able to build this graph because we used the strategy method where players 2 had to respond the amount returned to player 1 for each possible offer. The results show that trust is followed by reciprocity with higher amounts returned from player 2 to player 1. People being trusted showed higher levels of reciprocity by returning with positive returns the initial investment, consistent with much of the literature using the trust game (See Cardenas and Carpenter (2008) for a survey of field and lab experiments using the canonical version of trust game).
Players 2 returned on average 26.2% from their endowment including the amount received, which is very common in the trust game where players 2 usually capture more of the social pie produced in the game, but with reciprocity present in the way players 2 return higher amounts to players 1 who send higher offers. When we compare the amounts offered by players 1 across the four possible permutations between upstream (U) and downstream (D) players (See Table 3 ) only one level of offers seems to be statistically different from the others is when the water trust game starts downstream, that is, when players 1 are located downstream and send their offers to players upstream.
Table 3. T-test mean values of offers (p-value)
This phenomenon could explain in part why we observed in the irrigation game such lower contributions by players downstream; players downstream suffer more explicitly the effects of water extraction by players upstream and therefore are more sensible to such unidirectional externalities. Experience with such externalities can drive a reduction of trust among downstream inhabitants towards the rest of watershed users, and it is well reflected with both the experimental and actual location of the players in both games.
Regression Results
Irrigation Game
There are several types of variables at the individual, experimental session, and regional level that can also help explain the variation of the behavioral variables by our participants in the two games, beyond the experimental design and treatments. Therefore we conduct a regression analysis to explain the contributions by players in the provision stage of the irrigation game, and the offers levels by players 1 in the water trust game, to confirm our hypothesis of a downstream erosion of cooperation in the vertical collective action problem because of decreased trust by the downstream players in the game.
Our econometric strategy is as follows. First, we explain the individual contributions in the irrigation game as a function of the experimental conditions, including the round, the location in the irrigation system and the institutional treatment (baseline, communication, high fines and low fines); we then continue with the individual characteristics and given the richness of the demographics we were able to sample in the field. We include several context controls such as dummy variables for the watersheds and also for the particular five players' context. We chose therefore to run a robust standard errors fixed effects model where the fixed effects were captured by each of the particular 71 sessions conducted in the four watersheds. We test several formulations of the estimator including a pooled data model, a semi-pooled model with dummies for the watersheds, and an unspooled model where we estimate one separate regression for each of the watersheds. We also tested different institutional changes in round 11 for these sessions and compared them to the baseline treatment where players continued after round 11 under the same rules and incentives.
In table 4 we summarize the descriptive statistics of the irrigation game data set. We have about 7,000 observations since each of the 71 sessions was conducted for 20 rounds and for 5 players. The standard deviations of the variables used give us enough variation to conduct a regression analysis and derive some conclusions about the average behavior already analyzed in previous sections. The description of the variables is shown below. Table 5 we report the regression results for different models broken down by watersheds.
We have first a pooled model (1) where we regress the contribution level by player 1 as a function of the variables already mentioned. This model yields an R-squared of about 24.2% of the variation. When we add (2) the dummy effects for each of the watersheds (the omitted dummy corresponds to the Kapchorean basin) we find that they are statistically significant although the overall estimation power remains the same at 24.2% for the Rsquared value. We then estimate the same regression for each of the watershed subsamples (models (3), (4), (5) and (6)). As we will show, there are particularities to each of the watersheds that deserve attention as well as universal patterns that seem to remain across countries and watersheds.
Regarding our experimental design, we confirm that the location in the irrigation system (A,B,C,D,E) does play a significant role in the level of contributions; in the unspooled model for each of the watersheds we find that only for the case of Awach such effect is not We also find that the contributions by the other people in the group in the previous round help explain contributions with a negative effect. That is, the higher the contribution by the other four players the smaller the contribution by the average player in the next round. This contradicts the reciprocity effect but the size of the coefficient is rather small.
With respect to demographic characteristics of the participants we find that older people, living in larger households seem to contribute more to the provision stage of the game. The effect of age can be related to users experience around natural resources management and expectations about reciprocation and group cooperative behavior. Other factors do not seem to present a robust effect across the 6 models. For instance, the context of cooperation and community activities seems to have a significant effect for Fuquene and the two Kenyan watersheds but with contradicting signs for the case of Kapchorean; however, it was in this watershed that we observed very low levels of contributions (notice the dummy positive effects that need to be added to the constant and the omitted dummy); also notice the low value of the constant for the Kapchorean (6) model. With the coefficient size of "Others contributions lagged" substantially larger, and a shifter downwards for the evaluation of community participation of others and participation in organization by the player, these combined would explain quite consistently the much lower levels of cooperation in this watershed. Recall Graph 4 where we clearly observe how this watershed showed distinct patterns for the communication and low penalty treatments. Robust standard errors in parenthesis + significant at 10%; * significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level
The Water Trust Game
The rest of our statistical analysis of the verticality phenomenon focuses on the Water Trust
Game. In this case we have 142 observations (pairs) for 284 participants in this game, and sampled from different locations in two of the watersheds (Fuquene for the case of Colombia and Awach for the case of Kenya). Table 6 shows the summary statistics for the data available for both our players 1 and players 2 in the game. Notice that we have In table 7 we estimate the amount offered by player 1 to player 2 as a function of the same kind of explanatory variables used in the previous analysis. Model (1) considers the pooled data set, whereas model (2) includes a dummy for the Fuquene watershed which turned out to be significant (also consistent with the higher levels of contributions in the irrigation game for the Colombian samples). Models (3) and (4) consider the separate samples for each of the watersheds. Robust standard errors in parenthesis + significant at 10%; * significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1
Some robust results are worth mentioning. Reciprocal behavior drives trust by players 1.
Those expecting more are sending more amounts to players 2. This is consistent across the estimated models. Older and more educated people and females have a slight but not significant tendency to offer less. However, the more time the player has lived in the community the higher the offers with a significant effect.
Let us now turn to the verticality effect. We had already in our descriptive analysis of offers (See Graph 5) that the actual location of the player in the watershed might be playing a role.
We do find that the variable "Location of player 2" is significant and negative for all estimated models meaning that when the offers come from downstream players and player 2 is upstream, such offers decrease. That is, downstream players trust less upstream players and that has a significant effect on trust and social efficiency since each token not sent represents three less tokens not generated for the social efficiency of the pair of players.
Besides, we found relationship among offers and the beliefs of people related to the trustworthiness of players located on different places of the watershed. If people believe that most trustworthy people is located upstream the offer is higher, which shows the importance of the perception about uplands players to build stable solutions to watersheds problems.
These results about the effect of verticality in trust are consistent with the results of the Irrigation Game where the position of players in the game affects their cooperation decision, so the cooperation is higher in the case of upstream players because they have more opportunities to benefit from better water quantity and quality. As a consequence, the behavior of upstream players generates a lack of trust in downstream players that imposes difficulties to collective action in watersheds or irrigation systems.
The lack of trust generates barriers to build more efficient relations around water access.
The building of trust and the recognition of the interdependences among players are conditions to get players make decisions mutually beneficial for all the players engage in the relationship around water provision and appropriation.
Conclusions.
The challenge of vertical collective action emerges from the asymmetry in the location of players along the irrigation system. Headenders or upstream players have better opportunities to capture the benefits of a public project that maintains or produces water because they have an earlier access to the resource. On the other hand their actions cause direct externalities to those downstream. Therefore, tailenders or downstream players notice two effects on their well-being: those upstream have better chances to benefit from the resource, and their appropriation actions affect them directly. Further, the appropriation by those downstream has no direct effect on players upstream and therefore the possibility of signaling through reciprocal responses is less available for downstream players. In our irrigation game this mechanism seems to operate through the contribution stage. Players downstream are willing to contribute less than upstream players to the public project; it seems that the effect is if anything of negative reciprocity which triggers even more the vicious cycle of reciprocity, trust and reputation well described by Ostrom (1998) .
These effects can create a similar negative effect to that of heterogeneity in collective action in this case because of location. The distance created by these asymmetries i.e. better resource availability and unidirectional externalities from those upstream seems to reduce the level of trust and cooperativeness of downstream players. However, when players have the opportunity to communicate, the contribution patterns turn into more cooperative patterns, a result that has been reported in other studies with heterogeneous individuals, "even in an environment of extreme heterogeneity in subject endowments, communication was a powerful mechanism for promoting coordination, resulting in rents very close to those observed in the homogeneous set" (Ostrom, 2006) .
It seems that one major challenge to solve the vertical difficulties to collective action is to address the asymmetries in a manner that players perceive a more fair allocation of the resource and of the effort contributed to provide the resource. The proportionality between contributions and appropriation is part of the challenge. "When rules are based on a clear principle of proportionality and all participants recognized that the rules enable them to reach better outcomes than feasible in the "state of nature" game, and all are prepared to punish rule breakers, more productive equilibria are reached and sustained over time" (Ostrom and Gardner, 1993 comes to maintaining the system over time" (Ostrom and Gardner, 1993) .
The lack of trust among the two ends of the watershed, and in particular of players downstream who suffer the most the effects of the decisions and better location of those upstream, is a major challenge here. Further research is needed to explore the impacts of simply informing better about the expectations and intentions of both players upstream and downstream and how different government and non-government actors can play in decreasing this lack of trust that we observe both because of the experimental location or the actual locations of our hundreds of participants in Colombia and Kenya.
